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The Taxation of Corporate Earnings and Progressivity
IT is sometimes argued that, whatever its merits or demerits on other
grounds, the corporation income tax does add to the progressivity of
our tax system. Starting "from the two propositions:(1) the tax is
proportional to corporation income, and (2) a larger proportion of
the income of individuals in the higher-income classes is corporation
income paid to or accruing to them as shareholders than is the case
in the income of poorer individuals," the National Industrial Confer-
ence Board reached the conclusion that to "the extent that it is not
shifted, the burden of the federal corporation income tax, considered
by itself, is what is technically known as 'progressive'—the tax consti-
tutes a heavier burden in proportion to total income upon individuals
in the higher-income classes than upon individuals in the lower 'in-
come Among similar views expressed more recently is: "An-
other consideration with respect to a tax on corporate income, even if
it is deemed as a tax on the shareholders, is that such a tax serves to
burden the unearned income, as compared with earned income, and
to increase the progressiveness of the individual income '2
These contentions, even if valid (and cause for disagreement will
be set forth below), are subject to the obvious qualification that this
effect, i.e. increased progressivity, applies only to stockholders. There-
fore an inequality is injected into our tax system; since all taxpayers
at any given income level are not stockholders, individuals with in-
comes of the same size (but different composition) are subject to differ-
ent rates of tax. Much the same consideration is relevant when we limit
the analysis to stockholders, for not all stockholders at a given income
level receive the same proportion of their income from corporation
earnings.
Two approaches used in the preceding chapters in the examination
of the differential taxation of stockholders are particularly pertinent
to the alleged progressivity effect of the corporation income tax: the
findings in connection with the corporate tax; and evidence
assembled under the heading of the differential against stockholders.
The first approach will be employed to determine the progressivity
effect of the corporation income tax per se. The latter approach con-
1 The Shifting and Effects of the Federal Corporation Income Tax, National In-
dustrial Conference Board, Vol. II, 1928, P. 102.
2 From Congress of Industrial Organization memorandum, A Federal Tax Pro-
gram to Promote Full Employment, reprinted in Revenue Revision of 1950, Hear.
ings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d sess., Vol. I,
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PROGRESSIVITY EFFECT
siders the effect on progressivity of the existing method of taxing
stockholders during the period of our study, by analyzing the effect
of both the net corporate tax and the personal income tax saving due
to the failure of corporations to distribute all of their earnings.
More specifically, this chapter will examine the question of pro-
gressivity effect on two bases.
(1) First, the effect of the corporation income tax alone will be
discussed, using the net corporate tax, which is the excess of the cor-
poration income tax on earnings for distribution and earnings for
retention over the personal income tax that would have been due had
these corporation income tax payments been part of the taxable in-
come of stockholders. It is a measure of the net effect of the corpora-
tion income tax alone. This may be considered the narrow definition
of the problem, for it fails to take account of corporate distribution
policy—more specifically, it fails to take account of the fact that re-
tained earnings (after corporation income tax) escape personal income
taxes currently, and, at best, this is made up only partially via future
capital gains taxation.
(2) Secondly, the progressivity effects are also considered from a
broader perspective that takes account of both the net corporate tax
and the personal income tax saving. The excess of the former over
the latter is the differential against stockholders.
THE NET CORPORATE TAX AND PROGRESSIVITY
The community's consensus as to the desirable degree of progressivity
in our income tax structure is presumably mirrored by the personal
income tax schedule. This is taken as the standard or benchmark
against which the progressivity effect of the net corporate tax is meas-
ured. The comparisons are confined to "average" stockholders, over-
looking the complications, noted above, actually introduced by the
varying proportions of corporate earnings included in individual in-
comes. Limiting the examination of progressivity effectsto stock-
holders is consistent with the previously described incidence assump-
tion by which they alone are considered to be affected by the corpora.
tion income tax.3
The term "progression" is here employedin its usual sense to denote
an increase or decrease in the rate of tax relatively greater than the
increase or decrease in the size of the base on which the tax is assessed.
Various measures of the degree of progressivity, each of which has
3 Goode makes a similar computation, but for distributed earnings only, and ex-
presses the results in terms of the income of all taxpayers not merely stockholders
(Richard B. Goode, The Corporate income Tax, Wiley, 1951, pp. 93-94).
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its own peculiarities, are consistent with this general concept, and The findingson
different indications as to changes in progressivity may be obtained those on liability
according to the formula adopted. For this reason two measures have because of the n
been gressively than th
1) Average rate progression, which is based on the rate of change the —signindica
of the effective rate of tax and is defined as progressivity for
(T1/1'1)—. (T0/Y0)
1'l —Yo
where T stands for tax liability and Y for income, and the subscripts
1 and 0 denote adjacent income levels. Average rate progression re-
mains unchanged if a rate schedule is raised or lowered the same
number of percentage points at all levels of taxable
2) Liability progression which is "the ratio of the percentage change
in tax liability to the concurrent change in income."G It is defined as
T1—T0
T0 Y1—Y0
The coefficient of liability progression remains unchanged if the rates
of a given schedule are raised or lowered proportionately.7
4 The measures and the methods used in their computation are taken from R. A.
Musgiave and Tun Thin, "Income Tax Progression, 1929-48," Journal of Political
Economy, December 1948, pp. 498-514.
a Write T0/Y0 as E0 (E standing for effective rate) and T1/Y1 as E1. Then the
formula for average rate progression becomes (E1 —E0)/(P1 —F0).Let there be an
increase of a given number of percentage points in effective rate, say K. Then
average rate progression will equal[E1 + K —(E0+ K)]/ (F1 —F0).Butthis,
of course, is the same as (E1 —E0)/(F1 —F0).Therefore, if one effective rate sched-
ule exceeds another by the same number of percentage points they are, in terms of
this measure, equally progressive. Thus a comparison of progressivity based on
average rate progression is relatively simple. A constant ratio of net corporate tax
to imputed gross income signifies that the personal and the combined corporate.
personal income taxes were equally progressive; a falling ratio differential, moving
up the income scale, is an indication that the corporate-personal tax system was
less progressive, while the converse conclusion follows from a rising net corporate
tax ratio (ibid., p. 501).
8lbid., p.504.
7 In any comparison of two schedules at a given income level or over a given
range Y0/ (F1 —F0)will be unchange.., so it is necessary only to watch what hap.
pens to (T1 —T0)/T0.Let the tax due at each income level be raised by a fixed
percentage K. Then (T1 —T0)/T0 is replaced by (KT1 —KTQ)/KT0.But this
is the same as (T1 —T0)/T0.Thus a proportionate change in tax liability (and
hence tax rate) associated with a given income level leaves the degree of liability
progression unchanged (see ibid., p. 505). This facilitates comparison of the pro-
gressivity of two rate schedules under this definition. When the net corporate tax
rate, reading up the income scale, represents a continually growing percentage in-
crease in the effective rate of tax, liability progression has increased. The opposite
result connotes a decrease in progressivity, while a constant proportionate increase
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The findings on average rate progression are summarized in Table 23,
those on liability progression in Table 24. The +signmeans that,
because of the net corporate tax, stockholders were taxed more pro-
gressively than they would have been under the personal income tax;
the —signindicates the reverse result, and the = sign denotes equal
progressivity for the two systems.8
TABLE 23





























































































































































100.150 — — —
150-200 — — —
200-250 — — — —
250-500 + — — — += — — — — —
(+) means that, because ofthe netcorporate tax,stockholderswere taxed moreprogressively
than they would have been under the personal income tax.
(__) means the reverse finding.
()meansequal progressivity for the two systems.
8 These two measures of progressivity did not correspond at all points, and the
results, therefore, are not precisely comparable. But they serve for the rough pur-
pose at hand. Much laborious computation was saved by using a slightly different
base for each of the measures. The change in average rate progressivity was meas-
ured by computing the excess of the actually effective rate for stockholders over the
potential rate if their full pro rata share of corporate income tax payments had
been paid to them as personal income. With liability progression, the net corporate
tax was computed as a proportion of the effective rate of personal income tax on
adjusted gross incomes of the same size as the selected imputed gross income levels.











1940 1941 1944 194519461947 19481949 19501951 1952
1-2 — — — —+ -
2-3 — — — —• — — — —+ +
3-4 — — — — + — — — — — —
4-5 + —+ — — — — — — —
5-6 — — — — ++ — — — —-
6-8 — —+ — — —+.++ + +
8-10 — — — — — — — — — —
10-12 — — — —
12-15 + — — — — —+ — — — —
15-20 — — — — — — — — — —
20-25 — — — — — — — — — —+
25-50 — — — — — — — — — —
50-75 + — — — — — — — — — —
75-100 — — — —
100-150 —
150-200 — — — —
200-250 — — — — — — — — — —
250-500 + — — — — — — — — — —
(+) meansthat, because ofthe net stockholderswere taxed moreprogressively corporate tax,
than they would have been under the personal income tax.
(—)meansthe reverse finding.
()meansequal progressivity for the two systems.
The effect of the corporate income tax on the degree of progressivity
applying to the taxation of stockholders is clearly uneven. If one
particular definition—average rate progression—is adopted, the general
conclusion is that stockholders were taxed more progressively than
other income taxpayers similarly circumstanced in terms of the size
of their income, up to about the $12,000 income level, in the earlier
years of the decade, and to the $50,000 level from 1948 through 1952;
taxation was less progressive over the rest of the income range. Under
levels being derived from averages for all taxpayers. The adjusted gross incomes are
of different compositions, and, because they include different proportions of capital
gains, are subject to somewhat different rates from those implied in the average
rate progressivity computation. But this difference in base is a relatively minor factor
that tends to be submerged by the much more pronounced force exercised by the
net corporate tax in the final results. The findings on progressivity are, therefore,
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the second definition—liability progression—we find a less equivocal
'or orate Tax, picture. Here, almost without exception, it appears that stockholders
p were taxed less progressively than other taxpayers with a similar
amount of income subject only to the personal income tax.
PROGRESSIVITY EFFECT TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE
INCOME TAX SAVING
19511952 These conclusions hold when the income tax saving is also taken into
account. For this test, the three variants of the differential against
— stockholders(see Chapter 1) are utilized. To recapitulate: this differen-
— — tialis equal to the difference between (i.e. the algebraic sum of) the
— — netcorporate tax and the net income tax saving. The results tabulated
in Tables 25 and 26 indicate the effects on progressivity in the taxation
— ofstockholders caused by the two income taxes on stockholders corn-
— — paredwith the hypothetical effects of the personal income tax on their
—
— fullpro rata share of corporate earnings.
= Asin the case of the net corporate tax, we find under the average
— — rateprogression definition an uneven effect; an irregular increase in
— — progressivityover the lower portion of the income range and, above
== acertain point, lower progressivity than under the personal income
— — tax.Under the liability progression definition, the indications are that
— — overalmost the whole of the income range stockholders were taxed
—
— lessprogressively by the combined corporate.personal income tax sys-
tem than they would have been by the personal income tax alone.
Average rate and liability progression can be measured only as
between specified ranges of income, and these values vary over the
income scale. It has been suggested that progressivity could be meas-
ured also (and perhaps more meaningfully) in terms of a single value for
the entire income distribution. In this connection, Musgrave and Thin
have developed a definition—effective progression—based on the degree
to which the area between the line of "complete equality" and the
Lorenz curve derived from a particular distribution is reduced by
taxation.° This measure has been investigated specifically for four
years—1947, 1949, 1950, and 1952 (see Chapter 6). In brief summary,
the findings for all years were that, if stockholders had been taxed
in full on their pro rata share of corporate earnings, the after-tax dis-
tribution of stockholder income would have bent away less from the
line of "complete equality" than it did for the distribution which took
account of the corporate tax on all earnings and the personal tax
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Progressivity of the Corporate-Personal Income Tax on Stockholders




























































































































































































































































































































































were taxed more progressivelythan they would havebeenunder means that stockholders
the personal income tax.
(—) meansthe reverse finding; () means equal progressivity for the two systems.
a (—)appliesto each of the following income classes (thousands of dollars). for which separate
calculations were made: 25 to 50; 50 to 75; 75 to 100; 100 to 150; 150 to 200; 200 to 250; 250
to 500.
bFor1940, the progressivity was + in the $50,000 and under $75,000 class.
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10-12 — — — — — — — — — — —
12-15
15.500a + — — — —
— —
— — — — — —
Variant 2
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he two systems.
dollars), for which separate
150 to 200; 200 to 250; 250
)0 class.
(+) means that stockholders were taxed more progressively than they would have been under
the personal income tax.
(—)meansthe reverse finding.
means equal progressivity for the two systems.
a (—)appliesto each of the following income classes (thousands of dollars), for which separate
calculations were made: 15 to 20; 20 to 25; 25 to 50; 50 to 75; 75 to 100; 100 to 150; 150 to 200;
200 to 250; 250 to 500.
133 (PROGRESSIVITY EFFECT
gression, the actual combination of corporate and personal tax led to
less progressive taxation of stockholders than would have followed
from the personal income tax alone.
ERRATIC IMPACT OF THE PROGRESSIVITY EFFECT
Finally, it will be instructive to return to a problem noted as a compli-
cation and temporarily set aside—the unevenness of the alleged pro.
gressivity effect of the corporation income tax due to the fact that
stockholders with about the same total income have varying amounts
of net corporate earnings.
From stockholder cells for 1947, the chosen sample year, entries were
picked for individuals having almost identical levels of taxable income
after full imputation of corporate earnings. But the corporate earnings
component comprises different proportions of total taxable income;
thus the combination of corporate tax on all earnings and of personal
tax on dividends constitutes a varying incremental burden. How un-
even and indiscriminate the progressivity effects actually are is demon-
strated by the evidence in Table 27.
Among three stockholder cells, for example, for which the taxable
income was about $1,850, the extra burden due to the corporate tax
amounted in one cell to 3 per cent of income, in another to 9 per cent,
and in a third to 28 per cent.1° Reasons for the highly uneven effect
on progressivity are suggested by the data in column 8:the extra
burden of a 3 percentage point increase in effective rate of tax occurred
in a stockholder cell in which corporate earnings represented only
12 per cent of taxable income; the extra burden of 9 percentage points
characterized a cell in which 38 per cent of taxable income came from
corporate earnings; while the 28 percentage point extra burden arose
in a cell in which income was very heavily weighted with corporate
earnings, about 115 per cent of taxable income. (This happens when
income from sources other than corporate earnings is so small that
itis outweighed by deductions.) The type of results found at this
particular taxable income level was also observed at others(see
Table 27).
This evidence warrants the conclusion that even if it were true at
least over much of the income scale that, because of the corporation
income tax, stockholders are taxed more progressively than other tax-
10Thesecalculations are based on a comparison of the actual combined corporate-
personal tax and an estimate of what would have been due under the personal tax
both currently and in the future (from capital gains taxes on realized increments
in stock prices due to reinvestment). They correspond, therefore, to our variant 2
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2.
payers, the progression is of a rude, uneven, and indiscriminate type.
Of the 71 1,683 stockholders in the sample potentially subject to an
effective rate of personal income tax between 19 and 20 per cent (see
column 4), over three-fifths were actually taxed at between 20 and 25
per cent; one-quarter at between 25 and 30 per cent; one-tenth at
between 30 and 35 per cent; 1.6 per cent at between 35 and 40 per
cent; and almost 2 per cent at more than 45 per cent.
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